芒格主义 —— 查理·芒格智慧箴言 + 大道点评(上)

本文摘录自大道网易博客2012-06-26博文,博文由大道博友翻译,大道对绝大部分芒格语录进行了非常精彩的点评。

由于极速3分6合—极速5分6合文章要求字数有限,本文仅摘录博文上半部分。

1. 芒格主义 —— 查理·芒格智慧箴言(下)

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2. 沃伦·巴菲特永恒智慧名言集 —— 附大道点评

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1. Most people are too fretful, they worry too much.Success means being very patient, but aggressive when it’s time.

大部分人都太浮躁、担心得太多。成功需要非常平静耐心,但是机会来临的时候也要足够进取。

(大道批注:看完这条可不要too aggressive哈。芒格本人曾经就因为用margin给自己带来过大麻烦。我这个朋友也喜欢用margin,非常危险。)

2. Using [a stock’s] volatility as a measure of risk is nuts. Risk to us is 1) the risk of permanent loss of capital, or 2) the risk of inadequate return. Some great businesses have very volatile returns – for example, See’s [a candy company owned.

根据股票的波动性来判断风险是很傻的。我们认为只有两种风险:一,血本无归;二,回报不足。有些很好的生意也是波动性很大的,比如See's糖果通常一年有两个季度都是亏钱的。反倒是有些烂透了的公司生意业绩很稳定。

(大道批注:想想周围有多少人还在用“股票的波动性”来衡量风险吧。)

3. I think that, every time you saw the word EBITDA [earnings], you should substitute the word “bullshit” earnings.

所以看到在说EBITDA(税息折旧及摊销前利润)的公司时就要小心了,因为他们在用“狗屎”来说服你。

(大道批注:所谓的“息税折摊前利润”就是狗屎。)

4. Warren talks about these discounted cash flows. I’ve never seen him do one. “It’s true,” replied Buffett. “If the value of a company doesn’t just scream out at you, it’s too close.”

巴菲特有时会提到“折现现金流”,但是我从来没见过他真正算这个。(巴菲特答曰“没错,如果还要算才能得出的价值那就太不足恃了”)

(大道批注:就是毛估估的意思?!)

5. If you buy something because it’s undervalued, then you have to think about selling it when it approaches your calculation of its intrinsic value. That’s hard. But if you buy a few great companies, then you can sit on your ass. That’s a good thing.

如果你买了一个价值低估的股票,你就要等到价格达到你算出来的内在价值时卖掉,这是很难算的。但是如果你买了一个伟大的公司,你就坐那儿呆着就行了。

(大道批注:这条大概要花很多年才能真明白,大概就是未来现金流折现的意思。我觉得自己现在大概有点明白了。)

6. We bought a doomed textile mill [Berkshire Hathaway] and a California S&L [Wesco] just before a calamity. Both were bought at a discount to liquidation value.

我们买过一个纺织厂(Berkshire Hathaway)和一个加州的存贷行(Wesco),这俩后来都带来了灾难。但是我们买的时候,价格都比清算价值打折还低。

(大道批注:这个大概就是人们常说的价值陷阱,如果理解未来现金流折现的概念就容易理解芒格说的是啥了。所以未必市值低过净资产甚至现金的股票就值得投资,除非你能看懂你买的是什么。如果真的明白了“未来现金流折现”的思维方式,你对“价值陷阱”就自然明白了。)

7. For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists, it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots of things increase efficiency without increasing profits. It is way more likely to make American businesses less profitable than more profitable. This is perfectly obvious, but very little understood.

互联网对于社会是极为美好的,但是对于资本家来说纯属祸害。互联网能提高效率,但是有很多东西都是提高效率却降低利润的。互联网会让美国的企业少赚钱而不是多赚钱。

(大道批注:我也这么认为:internet 实际上是就业杀手,需要很多年才能消化。但是,如果能看懂这个变化则会非常有收获。你把所有投入互联网的投资加起来计算回报再减去同时由于互联网兴起造成的其他行业的亏损,就明白芒格讲的是什么意思了。巴菲特和芒格早就讲过,他们不喜欢变化,但如果你能看懂这些变化,你将赚大钱。)

8. Virtually every investment expert’s public assessment is that he is above average, no matter what is the evidence to the contrary.

市面上对每个投资专家的业绩评价都是高于平均的,不管有多少证据证明其实根本不是那回事儿。

(大道批注:这可是芒格说的哈。)

9. Investing is where you find a few great companies and then sit on your ass.

投资就是你能找到几个伟大的公司,然后什么也别干。

(大道批注:同上面第五条。)

10. Warren spends 70 hours a week thinking about investing.

巴菲特每个礼拜有70个小时花在思考投资上。

11. People calculate too much and think too little.

人们算得太多,想得太少。

(大道批注:投资上看起来确实如此。)

12. Whenever you think something or some person is ruining your life, it’s you. A victimization mentality is so debilitating.

无论何时,如果你觉得有东西在摧毁你的生活,那个东西就是你自己。老觉得自己是受害者的想法是最削弱自己的利器。

(大道批注:所以老爸不叫李刚也不是借口。)

13. The tax code gives you an enormous advantage if you can find some things you can just sit with.

税法决定了,还是买个伟大公司傻等它飞起来最划算。

(大道批注:对美国人尤其如此,外国人投美股有点不同。)

14. If you’re going to buy something which compounds for 30 years at 15% per annum and you pay one 35% tax at the very end, the way that works out is that after taxes, you keep 13.3% per annum. In contrast, if you bought the same investment, but had to pay taxes every year of 35% out of the 15% that you earned, then your return would be 15% minus 35% of 15%—or only 9.75% per year compounded. So the difference there is over 3.5%. And what 3.5% does to the numbers over long holding periods like 30 years is truly eye-opening…

如果你买的股票每年复利回报15%,持续30年,而你最后一次性卖掉的时候交35%的税,那你的年回报还有13.3%。反之,对于同一支股票,如果你每年都卖一次交一次税,那你的年回报就只有9.75%。这个3.5%的差距放大到30年是让人大开眼界的。

(大道批注:同上一条。)

15. The number one idea, is to view a stock as an ownership of the business [and] to judge the staying quality of the business in terms of its competitive advantage. Look for more value in terms of discounted future cash flow than you’re paying for. Move only when you have an advantage. It’s very basic. You have to understand the odds and have the discipline to bet only when the odds are in your favor.

最重要的,是要把股票看作对于企业的一小部分所有权,以企业的竞争优势来判断其内在的价值。要寻找未来折现的现金利润比你支付的股价高的机会。这是很基础的,你得明白概率,只有当你赢的概率更大的时候才去下赌注。

(大道批注:很稀饭这句。)

16. Failure to handle psychological denial is a common way for people to go broke. You’ve made an enormous commitment to something.You’ve poured effort and money in. And the more you put in, the more that the whole consistency principle makes you think,” Now it has to work. If I put in just a little more, then it ’all work…. People go broke that way —because they can ’t stop,rethink,and say,’ I can afford to write this one off and live to fight again. I don’t have to pursue this thing as an obsession —in a way that will break me.”

人们破产的常见原因是不能控制心理上的纠结。你花了这么多心血、这么多金钱,花的越多,就越容易这么想:“估计快成了,再多花一点儿,就能成了……” 人们就是这么破产的----因为他们就是不肯停下来想想:“之前投入的就算没了呗,我承受得起,我还可以重新振作。我不需要为这件事情沉迷不误,这可能会毁了我的。”

(大道批注:想起沉入成本。还想起老巴说的,如果是个坑就别再往下挖了。看看有多少人在给自己挖坑就明白了。)

17. In terms of business mistakes that I’ve seen over a long lifetime, I would say that trying to minimize taxes too much is one of the great standard causes of really dumb mistakes. I see terrible mistakes from people being overly motivated by tax considerations. Warren and I personally don’t drill oil wells. We pay our taxes. And we’ve done pretty well, so far. Anytime somebody offers you a tax shelter from here on in life, my advice would be don’t buy it.

说到我这辈子在生意中见过的错误,过度追求避税是一个常见的让人做傻事儿的原因。我看到有人为了避税干很大的错事。巴菲特和我虽然不是挖石油的,但是我们该交的税都交,我们现在也过得挺好的。要是有人向你兜售避税套餐,别买。

(大道批注:让我想起那些为避税而搬离加州的有钱的朋友们,为了省那些未来不属于自己的钱而搬到一个自己未必喜欢的地方好像有点滑稽。当然,搬过去后又喜欢上了那是有智慧的表现啊,至少我还没听说哪位搬家后说新地方不好的。)

18. I believe that we are at or near the apex of a great civilization….In 50-100 years, if we’re a poor third to some countries in Asia, I wouldn’t be surprised. If I had to bet, the part of the world that will do best will be Asia.

我认为美国正处于或者接近我们文明的顶点……如果50或者100年后,美国只比得上亚洲某国家的的三分之一,我一点儿也不会觉得奇怪。如果要赌,这世界上将来干得最棒的应该是亚洲。

(大道批注:或许50-100年也许稍微短了一点。)

19. To some extent, stocks are like Rembrandts. They sell based on what they’ve sold in the past. Bonds are much more rational. No-one thinks a bond’s value will soar to the moon. Imagine if every pension fund in America bought Rembrandts. Their value would go up and they would create their own constituency.

某些程度上,股票就像是伦勃朗的画。它们的价格是基于过去成交的价格。债券则要理性得多。没有人会认为债券的价格会高到天上去。想象一下如果美国的所有退休基金都去买伦勃朗的油画,它们都会升值并且引来一帮追随者。

(大道批注:那些喜欢炒艺术品当投资的有钱人也许可以看看,当然真的喜欢收藏的例外。)


20. It’s crazy to assume that what’s happening in Argentina and Japan is inconceivable here.

有人认为阿根廷和日本发生的事情在美国绝对不会发生,这种想法是很疯狂的。

(大道批注:我也有点这种疯狂的想法。[割肉]

21. REITs are way more suitable for individual shareholders than for corporate shareholders. And Warren has enough residue from his old cigar-butt personality that when people became disenchanted with the REITs and the market price went down to maybe a 20% discount from what the companies could be liquidated for, he bought a few shares with his personal money. So it’s nice that Warren has a few private assets with which to pick up cigar butts in memory of old times – if that’s what keeps him amused.

比起机构投资者,房产投资信托(REIT)更适合个人投资者。巴菲特还留着一些捡烟头性格(意指其早期偏重格雷厄姆式的投资价值低估企业的风格),这让他愿意在人们不喜欢房产投资信托并且市价跌出八折以内的时候,用自己的私房钱买点儿REIT。这种行为能让他回忆起当年捡烟头的快乐,所以他自己有点儿闲钱鼓捣这事儿也挺好的。

(大道批注:其实房地产生意是最容易解释未来现金流折现的概念的,只要把租金想成未来现金流就明白了。)

22. Smart people aren’t exempt from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just run aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods.

聪明人也不免遭受过度自信带来的灾难。他们认为自己有更强的能力和更好的方法,所以往往他们就在更艰难的道路上疲于奔命。

(大道批注:最简单的例子就是一个很会开车的人开了一辆很好的车但上高速时上反了入口哈。指的是聪明反被聪明误的那种?其实就是做对的事情(坚持不做错的事情),然后把事情做对。聪明往往指的是把事情做对的能力比较强,但知道坚持不做错的事情的人最后才会成大器,比如巴菲特。大家一定要分清做错的事情和在把事情做对的过程中所犯的错误的本质区别。在把事情做对的过程当中任何人都是会犯错的,包括巴菲特。但由于其坚持不做错的事情,所以犯大错的概率低,很多年以后的结果就完全不一样了。如果还不明白的话,就请看看那些一直很聪明但老是不如意的人们这些年都在忙啥就明白了。)

23. The whole concept of the house advantage is an interesting one in modern money management. The terms of the managers of the private partnerships look a lot like the take of the croupier at Monte Carlo, only greater.

“庄家优势”是个在现代理财学里很有意思的概念。那些机构的基金经理看上去很像是赌场里的总管,只是规模更大。

(大道批注:感觉就是这个意思,但不知道芒格当时的前言后语是啥。)

24. There are always people who will be better at some thing than you are.You have to learn to be a follower before you become a leader.

三人行必有我师,要成为领导者之前必须先做跟随者。

(大道批注:I have nothing to add.)

25. We all are learning, modifying, or destroying ideas all the time. Rapid destruction of your ideas when the time is right is one of the most valuable qualities you can acquire. You must force yourself to consider arguments on the other side. If you can’t state arguments against what you believe better than your detractors, you don’t know enough.

我们总是在学习、修正、甚至颠覆各种主意。在恰当时机下快速颠覆你的想法是一项很重要的品质。你要强迫自己去考虑对立的观点。如果你不能比你的对手更好地说服对方,那说明你的理解还不够。

(大道批注:呵呵,希望不是碰到猪一样的对手哈。有点逆向思维的意思?大概是认为人应该Open Mind才能有进步的意思吧。)

26. I remember the $0.05 hamburger and a $0.40-per-hour minimum wage, so I’ve seen a tremendous amount of inflation in my lifetime. Did it ruin the investment climate? I think not.

我以前那个年代,汉堡包5美分一个、最低时薪是40美分,所以我算是见证了巨大的通胀了。但它摧毁了投资环境吗?我不这么认为。

(大道批注:投资是抵抗通胀的最好办法,不是最好办法之一。所以没有闲钱投资是件痛苦的事情。)

27. A lot of success in life and business comes from knowing what you want to avoid: early death, a bad marriage, etc.

大部分生活和事业上的成功来自于有意避免了一些东西:早死、错误的婚姻、等等。

(大道批注:就是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。)

28. There are two types of mistakes: 1) doing nothing[We saw it, but didn’t act on it]; what Warren calls “sucking my thumb” and 2) buying with an eyedropper things we should be buying a lot of.

有两种错误:一,什么都不做(看到了机会却束之高阁),巴菲特说这个叫做“吮指之错”;二,本来该一堆一堆地买的东西,我们却只买了一眼药水瓶的量。

(大道批注:怎么看着像是一种错误?不过这种错误是不可避免的,但很用功的人会减少犯这种错误的概率。犯这种错误的代价实际上比犯频繁出手而导致失误的代价要小得多。)

29. Checklist routines avoid a lot of errors. You should have all of this elementary wisdom, and you should go through a mental checklist in order to use it. There is no other procedure that will work as well.

经常对照一下清单可以避免错误。你们应该掌握这些基础的智慧。对照清单之前还要过一遍心理清单(意指平常心),这个方法是无可替代的。

(大道批注:还是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。)

30. Litigation is notoriously time-consuming, inefficient, costly and unpredictable.

打官司是出了名的费时、费力、低效、以及难料结果。

31. Finding a single investment that will return 20% per year for 40 years tends to happen only in dreamland. In the real world, you uncover an opportunity, and then you compare other opportunities with that. And you only invest in the most attractive opportunities. That’s your opportunity cost. That’s what you learn in freshman economics. The game hasn’t changed at all. That’s why Modern Portfolio Theory is so asinine.

连续40年每年回报20%的投资只存在于梦想之国。现实世界中,你得寻找机会,然后和其他机会对比,最后只找最吸引人的机会投资进去。这就是你的机会成本,这是你大一经济课上就学到的。游戏并没有发生什么变化,所以所谓的“现代投资组合理论”非常愚蠢。

(大道批注:这游戏没变过,在哪里都一样。)

32. The more hard lessons you can learn vicariously rather than through your own hard experience, the better. Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it was fortuitous.

最好是从别人的悲惨经历中学到深刻教训,而不是自己的。我们有些成功是早就预言的,有些是意外获得的。

(大道批注:不听老人言,吃苦在眼前和眼后。看了这句话以后,其实大多数人们还是不会听的。能从自己的错误里吸取教训就已经很了不起了,若能从别人的错误里吸取教训的那都是天才。坚持犯自己犯过的错误的人也不用太不高兴啊,至少股市上85%以上的人是这样的。有人陪总是一件不错的事情。[俏皮]

33. The general assumption is that it must be easy to sit behind a desk and people will bring in one good opportunity after another — this was the attitude in venture capital until a few years ago. This was not the case at all for us — we scrounged around for companies to buy. For 20 years, we didn’t buy more than one or two per year. …It’s fair to say that we were rooting around. There were no commissioned salesmen. Anytime you sit there waiting for a deal to come by, you’re in a very dangerous seat.

一般认为,最好的情形就是你坐在办公室里,然后美好的投资机会一个接一个地被送到你的面前。直到几年之前,风投界的人们就是这样享受的。但是我们完全不是这样,我们就跟要饭似的到处寻找好公司来买。20年来,我们每年最多投资一到两个公司。说我们已经挖地三尺了都不夸张,好机会是没有专业推销员的。如果你坐在那里等待好机会来临,那你的座儿很危险。

(大道批注:这个有点累。)

34. Our biggest mistakes, were things we didn’t do, companies we didn’t buy.

我们最大的错误是:该做的没做、该买的没买。

(大道批注:对这句话巴菲特很多次说过,不是指错失的能力圈以外的机会,比如微软。巴菲特特别强调的是有时候在发现能力圈内的机会的时候,不知道什么原因,一直忙着“吸手指”而错过了机会。比如几年前,当我拿到别人送我的ipod的时候,我很震撼但却没有反应是一个意思,那是一个数以亿记的错误,但财务上是看不到这种错误的。)

35. You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.

你只有学会如何学习你才会进步。

(大道批注:虽然投资不需要大学文凭,但上过大学往往还是有帮助的(不是充要条件),因为大学里学到的东西主要是学习方法。充要条件是什么?那是初中学的吧?反正我是初中学平面几何时学的,但好像是很久以后才真的明白。充要条件的概念,或者说什么是充分条件,什么是必要条件,什么是充要条件,什么是既不充分也不必要的这些概念对投资很重要。之所以我认为其很重要是因为我发现大多数人在逻辑上其实是不懂什么是充要条件的,我认为至少有85%的人在投资上不明白充要条件。)

36. It is remarkable how much long-term advantage people like us have gotten by trying to be consistently not stupid, instead of trying to be very intelligent.

我们长期努力保持不做傻事,所以我们的收获比那些努力做聪明事的人要多得多。

(大道批注:小聪明和大智慧的差别,也是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。)

37. Berkshire’s past record has been almost ridiculous. If Berkshire had used even half the leverage of, say, Rupert Murdoch, it would be five times its current size.

BRK的过去业绩简直辉煌得离谱。如果我们也用杠杆,哪怕比默多克用的少一半,也会比现在的规模大五倍。

(大道批注:经常有很多人用很多Margin,然后去和BRK比某年的投资回报率,但没多少人可以把30年的总回报拿来比的,30年以后可能还是如此。突然看成BBK了。[笑]

38. It took us months of buying all the Coke stock we could to accumulate $1 billion worth — equal to 7% of the company. It’s very hard to accumulate major positions.

买可口可乐股票的时候我们花了几个月才攒了10亿美元的股票,是可口可乐总市值的7%。要攒成主要股东是很难的。

(大道批注:对没有10亿美金的人来说更难。[捂脸]

39. All large aggregations of capital eventually find it hell on earth to grow and thus find a lower rate of return.

所有的大资本最终都会发现很难扩大,于是去寻找一些回报率更低的途径。

(大道批注:这时候该分红或回购了,这也是今天的BRK所遇到的问题。)

40. If you have only a little capital and are young today, there are fewer opportunities than when I was young. Back then, we had just come out of a depression. Capitalism was a bad word. There had been abuses in the 1920s. A joke going around then was the guy who said, ‘I bought stock for my old age and it worked — in six months, I feel like an old man!’ “It’s tougher for you, but that doesn’t mean you won’t do well — it just may take more time. But what the heck, you may live longer.

如果今天你的资本较少并且年轻,你的机会比我们那时候要少。我们年轻的时候刚走出大萧条,资本主义在那时候是一个贬义词,在20年代对资本主义的批判更是肆虐。那时候流行一个笑话:有个人说“我买股票是为老了的时候考虑,没想到六个月就用上了!我现在已经觉得自己是老人了。”你们的环境更加艰难,但并不意味着你们做不好。只是要多花些时间。但是去他娘的,你们还可能活的更长呢。

(大道批注:cow,你还抱怨不?)

41. Regarding the demographic trend called Baby Boomers, it’s peanuts compared to the trend of economic growth.? Over the last century, [our] GNP is up seven times.? This was not caused by Baby Boomers, but by the general success of capitalism and the march of technology.? Those trends were so favorable that little blips in the birth rate were not that significant.??We can keep social peace as long as GNP rises 3% annually – this can pay for spending by politicians.? If we ever got to stasis [no growth], then with all the promises, you’d get real tensions between the generations.? The Baby Boomers would exacerbate it, but the real cause would be lack of growth.

关于所谓“婴儿潮(美国上世纪50、60年代出生)”的人口学现象,其影响相对经济增长的影响来说小很多。过去的一个世纪,美国的GNP(国民生产总值)增长了7倍。这不是婴儿潮导致的,而是由美国资本主义的成功和技术的发展带来的。这两样东西的影响太利好,婴儿潮问题相比之下就是一个小波动。只要美国的GNP每年增长3%,就能保持社会和平,足以覆盖政客们的花销。如果美国的发展停滞了,我敢保证,你们将会见证真切的代沟,不同代的人之间关系会很紧张。婴儿潮是这种紧张的催化剂,但是根本原因还是经济不增长。

(大道批注:中国如果经济不增长的话问题恐怕也很大。)

42. Practically everybody overweighs the stuff that can be numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques they’re taught in academia, and doesn’t mix in the hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important. That is a mistake I’ve tried all my life to avoid, and I have no regrets for having done that.

实际上,每个人都会把可以量化的东西看得过重,因为他们想“发扬”自己在学校里面学的统计技巧,于是忽略了那些虽然无法量化但是更加重要的东西。我一生都致力于避免这种错误,我觉得我这么干挺不错的。

(大道批注:我觉得我干得也不错。我把这个叫定性分析。)

43. You must know the big ideas in the big disciplines, and use them routinely — all of them, not just a few. Most people are trained in one model — economics, for example — and try to solve all problems in one way. You know the old saying: to the man with a hammer, the world looks like a nail. This is a dumb way of handling problems.

你应该对各种学科的各种思维都有所理解,并且经常使用它们,或者它们的全部,而不是某几个。大部分人都熟练于使用某一个单一的模型,比如经济学模型,去解决所有的问题。应了一句老话:“拿着锤子的木匠,看书上的字儿就觉着像钉子。” 这是一种很白痴的做事方法。

(大道批注:“看书上的字儿就觉着像钉子”怎么看着像:这世界看起来像钉子?)

44. The whole concept of dividing it up into ‘value’ and ‘growth’ strikes me as twaddle. It’s convenient for a bunch of pension fund consultants to get fees prattling about and a way for one advisor to distinguish himself from another. But, to me, all intelligent investing is value investing.

对我而言,把股票分成“价值股”和“成长股”就是瞎搞。当然这种分法可以让基金经理们借以夸夸其谈、也可以让分析师们给自己贴个标签,但是在我眼中,所有靠谱的投资都是价值投资。

(大道批注:对我而言,把经济分成“传统经济”和“新经济”,以及把企业分成“传统企业”和“高新科技企业”也是瞎搞。)

45. In my whole life, I have known no wise people who didn’t read all the time – none, zero. You’d be amazed at how much Warren reads, at how much I read. My children laugh at me. They think I’m a book with a couple of legs sticking out.

我这一辈子认识的所有智者,没有不爱看书的。我和巴菲特看书之多都能吓着你。我的孩子取笑我说我就是一本长有两条腿的书。

(大道批注:[呵呵]我以前爱看武侠小说。[滴汗]

46. We read a lot? I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read a lot.? But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab ideas and do sensible things.? Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know what to do with them.

我们都爱大量阅读,聪明人都这样,但这还不够,你还应该有一种批判接受、合理应用的态度。大部分人看书都没有抓到正确的重点,看完了又不会学以致用。

(大道批注:我看书虽然不大量,但抓正确重点的能力还自认为不错。有一点一直不明白的是,如果我很同意作者的观点,为什么还要看这本书呢,既然书上讲的多是为了说服人家的东西?还有就是,如果我很不同意作者的观点,往往就看不下去,比如国内机场卖的很多如何投资或经营企业的书。找本好书看还是很重要的!)

47. We get these questions a lot from the enterprising young. It’s a very intelligent question: You look at some old guy who’s rich and you ask, ‘How can I become like you, except faster?

我们经常从那些上进的孩子们那儿听到这些问题。这是个很“聪明”的问题,你对着一个有钱老头问:“我怎么才能成为你呢?怎么才能迅速地成为你呢?”

(大道批注:“except faster”就是如果不能更快的话。我觉得怎么才能迅速地成为你呢?翻得很好哈。我也经常碰到类似的问题,而且潜台词往往是我比你还聪明,所以我应该可以更快,只要告诉我秘诀就行了。其实秘诀很简单,把巴菲特说过的所有东西都看20遍,如果一遍看不懂的话,再悟20年,就知道自己有没有可能做好了,已经懂的例外。)

48. It takes almost no capital to open a new See’s candy store. We’re drowning in capital of our own that has almost no cost. It would be crazy to franchise stores like some capital-starved pancake house. We like owning our own stores as a matter of quality control.

我们如果要再开一家喜诗糖果几乎不用花费任何资本。我们的资本太多了都快淹死我们了,所以几乎是零成本。对于有些极度缺钱的煎饼店,增设特许经营店简直是疯狂的事情。我们喜欢搞直营店以便更好地控制服务品质。

(大道批注:大概是认为特许经营店的做法会砸牌子的意思吧?我对麦当劳当年一直不在中国搞特许经营影响很深,不知道现在有没有开始?)

49. It’s dangerous to short stocks.

做空的行为是很危险的。

(大道批注:确实是非常危险的,不该做空的理由:做空时不光要面对基本面,还要面对市场的疯狂。任何人都可能会犯错,但做空犯错可能会会对无限风险,看看前几年做空大众汽车的那个案例就明白了。)


50. Being short and seeing a promoter take the stock up is very irritating. It’s not worth it to have that much irritation in your life.

坐在空头位置,又看到股价遇到利好大涨,这是一件特别让人气愤的事情。人生苦短,遭受这种气愤太不值当了。

(大道批注:这大概是芒格年轻时的体会,很不幸我也体会过了。)

51. It would be one of the most irritating experiences in the world to do a lot of work to uncover a fraud and then at have it go from X to 3X and and have the crooks happily partying with your money while you’re meeting margin calls. Why would you want to go within hailing distance of that?

世界上最郁闷的事情之一,就是你费尽力气发现了一个骗局(并且做空这个公司),但是眼睁睁地看着它的股价继续疯涨三倍,而且这些骗子们还拿着你的钱弹冠相庆,而且你还要收到证券行的保证金追加通知。像这种郁闷的事情你哪能去碰呢?

(大道批注:同上条。)

52. The cost of being a publicly traded stock has gone way, way up. It doesn’t make sense for a little company to be public anymore. A lot of little companies are going private to be rid of these burdensome requirements?

上市的代价已经变得非常高了。一个小公司去谋求上市是没有什么道理的。很多小公司正在走私有化的路子以此摆脱上市公司的繁冗负担。

(大道批注:小公司上市确实没啥道理。在美股,大概上市公司最基本的费用也得接近200万美金一年?如果是一家赚不到1000万美金一年的公司,上市干嘛呢?想起看到不少国内来美股上市的公司还不断把已经上市的公司拆成更多的上市公司就觉得费解。)

53. Well the open-outcry auction is just made to turn the brain into mush: you’ve got social proof, the other guy is bidding, you get reciprocation tendency, you get deprival super-reaction syndrome, the thing is going away… I mean it just absolutely is designed to manipulate people into idiotic behavior.

公开叫价的竞价方式就是设计来让人的脑子变成一锅粥的:由于别人也在叫价,你觉得(你的竞价)得到了社会认同,你会有一种回馈倾向,会陷入一种“被剥夺超级反应综合症”,觉得(必须想方设法阻止)你的“心头好”离你而去……总之我的意思就是这种方式就是设计来操纵人的心理的,让人们去做白痴的事情。

(大道批注:不太清楚前言后语,大概像是说股市这种叫价系统会让有些人糊涂的意思?比如当有人出到20块的时候,你就会觉得手里的东西值20块?)

54. The problem with closed bid auctions is that they are frequently won by people making a technical mistake, as in the case with Shell paying double for Belridge Oil. You can’t pay double the losing bid in an open outcry auction.

暗标竞价的问题在于标的物常常被那些犯了技术错误的一方赢得,比如壳牌石油支付给贝利奇石油的价格是(另一方的)两倍。在公开叫价的竞标中,你就不可能比输掉的那一方多付一倍的价钱。

(大道批注:央视是不是跟这学的?)

55. We’re partial to putting out large amounts of money where we won’t have to make another decision.

我们偏爱把大量的金钱投放到那些不需要我们再做什么其他决策的地方。

(大道批注:大概和我投苹果的感觉差不多。)

56. Understanding how to be a good investor makes you a better business manager and vice versa.

能理解投资的真髓也能让你成为一个好的企业管理者,反之亦然。

(大道批注:巴菲特也说过类似的话,本人很认同。)

57. What’s fascinating . . .is that you could now have a business that might have been selling for $10 billion where the business itself could probably not have borrowed even $100 million. But the owners of that business, because its public, could borrow many billions of dollars on their little pieces of paper- because they had these market valuations. But as a private business, the company itself couldn’t borrow even 1/20th of what the individuals could borrow.

有件事情很有意思:你可能拥有一家价值100亿美元的公司,而这家公司可能连1亿美元都借不到。但是,由于公司是上市公司,公司的大股东凭着手里的小纸片(股票)做担保却能借到好几十亿美元。但是如果公司不是上市的,它可能连那些大股东能借到的20分之一的钱都借不到。

(大道批注:这个很有趣。大概原因是人们会以为股票的市值总是可以值那么多的,但实际上往往不是,就像昨天SVU突然掉了一半一样。)

58. I constantly see people rise in life who are not the smartest – sometimes not even the most diligent. But they are learning machines; they go to bed every night a little wiser than when they got up. And, boy, does that habit help, particularly when you have a long run ahead of you.

我经常见到一些并不聪明的人成功,他们甚至也并不十分勤奋。但是他们都是一些热爱学习的“学习机器”;他们每天晚上睡觉的时候都比那天早上起床的时候稍微多了那么一点点智慧。伙计,如果你前面有很长的路要走的话,这可是大有裨益的啊。

(大道批注:在坚持做对的事情的前提下,把事情做对的能力是可以学习的,只要每天进步一点就行。)

59. The basic concept of value to a private owner and being motivated when you’re buying and selling securities by reference to intrinsic value instead of price momentum – I don’t think that will ever be outdated.

不管是对于私有企业的企业主还是上市公司的股东,进行买卖时参考的标准应该是企业内在价值而不是过往成交的纪录,这是最基本的价值概念,而且我认为永远也不会过时。

(大道批注:买股票和成本无关,买股票和其以前到过什么价无关。有关的东西永远只有唯一一个,就是企业的内在价值。想想周围有多少人卖股票的理由和成本的关系,以及买股票时有多少人会说这只股票曾经到过多少钱吧。)

60. Warren and I have not made our way in life by making successful macroeconomic predictions and betting on our conclusions.

巴菲特和我不是因为成功预测了宏观经济并且依此下注才获得今天的成功的。

(大道批注:我也不是。)

61. Well, the questioner came from Singapore which has perhaps the best economic record in the history of any developing economy and therefore he referred to 15% per annum as modest. It’s not modest–it’s arrogant. Only someone from Singapore would call it modest.

这位提问者来自新加坡,新加坡可能是世界历史上成绩最辉煌的发展中经济,所以这位提问者才会把15%的增长率称作“保守”。但其实这不是“保守”,这是很狂妄的。只有新加坡来的人才敢把15%称作“保守”。

(大道批注:15%是无法长期保持的。记得以前在国内看到某些公司(蛮大的公司)说自己的成长速度可以保持80-100%就觉得很晕。曾经有过100%的成长速度和可以保持100%的成长速度是完全两码事。顺便说下,大概经济学家都是不太懂物理的,[好失望](个别懂的别委屈哈),非把物理里面的加速度说成速度,把物理里的速度说成经济总量。在物理里,速度是可以保持的,在经济里不行。)

62. I don’t spend much time, regretting the past, once I’ve taken my lesson from it. I don’t dwell on it.

我不会花太多时间追悔过去,一旦吸取了教训,我就不会再陷在里面了。

(大道批注:追悔也没用。)

63. If you took our top fifteen decisions out, we’d have a pretty average record. It wasn’t hyperactivity, but a hell of a lot of patience. You stuck to your principles and when opportunities came along, you pounce on them with vigor.

如果你从我们的投资决策里剔除掉最好的那15个,我们的表现就显得非常平庸了。(游戏的重点)不是非常多的动作而是非常大的耐心。你要坚守你的原则,当机会出现的时候,就大力出击。

(大道批注:平均两年做一个大的投资决策的效果肯定比一年做两个更好。)

64. We just throw some decisions into the ‘too hard’ file and go onto the others.

我们会把一些决策议题扔进名字叫做“太难了”的档案柜里,然后去看其他的议题。

(大道批注:呵呵,想起刚刚有人问我SVU怎么样的事情。这么难的事情我是搞不懂的。)

65. Forgetting your mistakes is a terrible error if you are trying to improve your cognition.

如果想提高你的认知能力,忘记过去犯过的错误是坚决不行的。

(大道批注:想起小偷被抓以后,满脑子都是如何改进偷技的想法的那个故事。所以这里的错误有两种性质的:1.做了错的事情,以后不能再做,然后放上Stop Doing List。2. 在做对的事情上犯了错误,这个不可避免,但可以通过学习改进。那个小偷犯的是第一个错,但用的是第二个的改进办法,会更糟的。)

66. In the 1930s, there as a stretch here you could borrow more against the real estate than you could sell it for. I think that’s what’s going on in today’s private-equity world.

30年代的时候,靠房产抵押得到的贷款可以比房子的售价更多。这大概就是现在私募股权领域的情形。

(大道批注:Pe那么容易拿到钱吗?怪不得突然满世界的人都在做Pe。)

67. Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean.

模仿一大堆人意味着接近他们的平均水平。

(大道批注:到平均水平也不太容易吧?)

68. A lot of opportunities in life tend to last a short while, due to some temporary inefficiency… For each of us, really good investment opportunities aren’t going to come along too often and won’t last too long, so you’ve got to be ready to act and have a prepared mind.

生命中的很多机遇都只会持续一小段时间,它们持续是因为(别人)暂时不便(攫取它)……对于我们每个人,机不可失时不再来,所以你最好随时预备好行动并且有足够的思想准备。

(大道批注:Nothing to add。)

69. Everywhere there is a large commission, there is a high probability of a ripoff.

有巨额佣金的地方常常就有骗局。

(大道批注:没有天上掉馅饼的事?)

70. Acknowledging what you don’t know is the dawning of wisdom.

承认自己不懂某样东西意味着智慧的曙光即将来临。

(大道批注:不然不肯学习。)

71. Recognize reality even when you don’t like it – especially when you don’t like it.

即使你不喜欢现实,也要承认现实。其实越是你不喜欢,你越应该承认现实。

(大道批注:一定要勇于面对现实,我的意思是勇于面对那些残酷的现实。)

72. We try more to profit from always remembering the obvious than from grasping the esoteric.

我们努力做到通过牢记常识而不是通过知晓尖端知识赚钱。

73. Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return that the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns six percent on capital over forty years and you hold it for that forty years, you’re not going to make much different than a six percent return – even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns eighteen percent on capital over twenty or thirty years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with one hell of a result.

长期而言,一个公司股票的盈利很难比这个公司的盈利多。如果公司每年赚6%持续40年,你最后的年化回报也就是6%左右,即使你买的时候股票有很大的折扣。但反过来如果公司每年资产收益率达18%并且持续二三十年,即使你买的时候看起来很贵,他还是会给你带来惊喜

(大道批注:这就是未来现金流折现的意思---不懂未来现金流折现的意思的人快来看这条---如果你非要用公式,现在可以用一下。注:这里的6%和18%指的不是成长速度。)

74. Just as a man working with his tools should know its limitations, a man working with his cognitive apparatus must know its limitations.

就像工人必须了解自己工具的局限性,用脑子吃饭的人也要知道自己脑子的局限性。

(大道批注:知道自己的能力圈有多大比能力圈有多大重要。)


第一部分完结!

极速3分6合—极速5分6合转发:75回复:12喜欢:181

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林中小鹿11-13 18:34

没事有事多回味

未来世界200011-11 22:08

snowcity9911-11 17:02

芒格主义,大道点评 上

享下11-09 15:48

80. I try to get rid of people who always confidently answer questions about which they don’t have any real knowledge.”
我尽量远离那些不懂装懂的人

南山牧雪人11-09 12:41