芒格主义 —— 查理·芒格智慧箴言(下)

备注:

1. 芒格主义 —— 查理·芒格智慧箴言 + 大道点评(上)

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2. 沃伦·巴菲特永恒智慧名言集 —— 附大道点评

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正文:

75. Many markets get down to two or three big competitors—or five or six. And in some of those markets, nobody makes any money to speak of. But in others, everybody does very well.? Over the years, we’ve tried to figure out why the competition in some markets gets sort of rational from the investor’s point of view so that the shareholders do well, and in other markets, there’s destructive competition that destroys shareholder wealth.? If it’s a pure commodity like airline seats, you can understand why no one makes any money. As we sit here, just think of what airlines have given to the world—safe travel, greater experience, time with your loved ones, you name it. Yet, the net amount of money that’s been made by the shareholders of airlines since Kitty Hawk, is now a negative figure—a substantial negative figure. Competition was so intense that, once it was unleashed by deregulation, it ravaged shareholder wealth in the airline business.? Yet, in other fields—like cereals, for example—almost all the big boys make out. If you’re some kind of a medium grade cereal maker, you might make 15% on your capital. And if you’re really good, you might make 40%. But why are cereals so profitable—despite the fact that it looks to me like they’re competing like crazy with promotions, coupons and everything else? I don’t fully understand it.? Obviously, there’s a brand identity factor in cereals that doesn’t exist in airlines. That must be the main factor that accounts for it.And maybe the cereal makers by and large have learned to be less crazy about fighting for market share—because if you get even one person who’s hell-bent on gaining market share…. For example, if I were Kellogg and I decided that I had to have 60% of the market, I think I could take most of the profit out of cereals. I’d ruin Kellogg in the process. But I think I could do it. You must have the confidence to override people with more credentials than you whose cognition is impaired by incentive-caused bias or some similar psychological force that is obviously present. But there are also cases where you have to recognize that you have no wisdom to add – and that your best course is to trust some expert.

许多市场最终会形成两到三个大竞争者,或者五到六个。其中有些市场里压根儿没有人能赚到什么钱。有些市场里每个竞争者都做得不错。多年以来,我们一直在研究,为什么有些市场里竞争比较理性,股东们获得的回报都不错,而有些市场里的竞争则让股东血本无归。我们举航空公司的例子来说吧,咱们现在坐在这里,可以想到航空公司们为世界作出的各种贡献:安全的旅行、更好的体验、能够随时飞向你的爱人,等等。但是,这个行业自从莱特兄弟的时代以来,给股东们回报的总利润是负的,而且是一个巨大的负数。这个市场里的竞争是如此激烈,以至于一旦放开监管,航空公司们就开始用大降价来损害股东们的权益。然而,在另外一些行业里,比如麦片行业,几乎所有的竞争者都混得挺舒服。如果你是一家中型的麦片生产商,你大概能有15%的资产回报率。如果你的本事特别好,甚至能达到40%。但是为什么麦片这么挣钱呢?在我看来他们整天搞各种疯狂的营销、推广、优惠券来激烈竞争,竟然还这么挣钱。我不是很明白。显然,品牌效应的因素是麦片行业有而航空行业没有的。这可能是个主要因素。或者麦片生产商们有共识,认为谁都不可以那么疯狂地竞争,因为如果有一个二楞子视市场占有率如命根,比如说如果我是家乐氏的老板然后我决定要抢占60%的市场占有率,我想我可以把这个市场的大部分利润都给弄没了。这个过程中我可能会把家乐氏给毁掉。但是我想我还是可以做到占据市场以及消灭行业利润。你应该有信心去颠覆那些比你资深的人,条件是他们的认知被动机导致的偏见蒙蔽了、或者被类似的心理因素明显影响了。但是在另外一些情况下,你应该认识到你也许没有什么新意可想,你最好的选择就是相信这些领域中的专家。

(大道批注:我认为和产品的差异化程度有关。产品差异化程度越低,行业内的企业越难赚到钱。航空公司是极致,就是因为产品差异化小。还有一个极致的例子就是现在很多做太阳能硅片的,下场会比航空公司还惨。芒格说他不懂不知道是什么意思,或许是调侃的吧?感觉上最没有差异化的产品就是硅片,因为用户最后只会关心每度电的成本,所以这个行业实际上是效率的竞争。长期而言,只有某些能真的做出高效率光电转换的产品的企业才能生存下来,而且他们的产品以后很可能就是发电厂。航空公司实际上的差异化也非常小,除非某航空公司的安全性被怀疑,否则消费者的关心点会主要集中在从a点到b点的成本。当然,服务态度会有一点点差异(如果服务态度很不好则会有很大差异)。所以以上两个行业会是价格竞争异常激烈的行业。你说的其他几个行业的差异化程度都比这两个行业或多或少要高一些。有些行业看起来差异化很小,其实有些“小东西”会造成很大的差异化,比如零售的地理位置往往会让人们会觉得方便比价钱重要等等,尤其是价钱不贵的东西。吃喝的东西心理上的差异化其实很大的,当然渠道的差异化也很厉害,比如可口可乐的护城河中在哪里都能买到这点是非常厉害的。)

76. In business we often find that the winning system goes almost ridiculously far in maximizing and or minimizing one or a few variables — like the discount warehouses of Costco.

我们发现那些在生意中优胜的“系统”往往有些变量被近乎荒谬地最大化或者最小化,比如Costco的打折仓储店。

77. There are worse situations than drowning in cash and sitting, sitting, sitting. I remember when I wasn’t awash in cash — and I don’t want to go back.

有些情况比坐拥大量现金无处可投更糟糕。我还记得当年缺钱的情景,我可不想回到那个时候。

78. If you always tell people why, they’ll understand it better, they’ll consider it more important, and they’ll be more likely to comply.

如果你(在发出指令和诉求的时候)总是告诉他们你的原因,他们就会更好地理解你的意图,并且觉得你的想法更重要,他们也就更愿意听你的。

79. Spend less than you make; always be saving something. Put it into a tax-deferred account. Over time, it will begin to amount to something. This is such a no-brainer.

量入而出、时刻攒钱、把钱放到可以延期交税的账户里。时间长了,你就会攒出一笔财富了。 这完全不需要动什么脑子

80. I try to get rid of people who always confidently answer questions about which they don’t have any real knowledge.”

我尽量远离那些不懂装懂的人。

(大道批注:知道自己的能力圈在哪远远比能力圈有多大重要,投资的人绝大多数都是倒在能力圈外的,虽然大多数最后都不明白为什么中的招。不过,因为看了这句话就认为自己有能力圈了也是蛮有趣的。)

81. I believe in the discipline of mastering the best that other people have ever figured out. I don’t believe in just sitting down and trying to dream it all up yourself. Nobody’s that smart.

我觉得先好好掌握别人已经整理好的知识才是靠谱的学习方法。我不认可那种闭门造车自己鼓捣出结果的方法。没人能那么聪明。

82. I know someone who lives next door to what you would actually call a fairly modest house that just sold for $17 million. There are some very extreme housing price bubbles going on.

我有个熟人,他们家旁边那个房子看起来很不起眼的,但是竟然卖了1700万美元。房市价格有很极端的泡沫。

83. Experience tends to confirm a long-held notion that being prepared, on a few occasions in a lifetime, to act promptly in scale, in doing some simple and logical thing, will often dramatically improve the financial results of that lifetime. A few major opportunities, clearly recognizable as such, will usually come to one who continuously searches and waits, with a curious mind that loves diagnosis involving multiple variables. And then all that is required is a willingness to bet heavily when the odds are extremely favorable, using resources available as a result of prudence and patience in the past.

经验告诉我们,当机会来临的时候,如果你有足够的准备并且适时、果断、有魄力地做一些简单而合理的事情,就能奇迹般地让你致富。偶尔出现的这种机会往往赐予那些时刻准备着、一直搜寻着、并且愿意分析复杂事物的人。当机会出现的时候,你所要做的全部事情就是使用你平时谨慎耐心攒下来的弹药、大手下注在那些胜算极大的赌局上。

84. The present era has no comparable referent in the past history of capitalism. We have a higher percentage of the intelligentsia engaged in buying and selling pieces of paper and promoting trading activity than in any past era. A lot of what I see now reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah. You get activity feeding on itself, envy and imitation. It has happened in the past that there came bad consequences.

现在这个时代是以往的资本主义中没见过的。与以往相比,我们有史上最多的知识分子投身在炒卖股票和投机倒把上。许多我所见到的事情让我联想起索多玛和蛾摩拉(堕落罪恶之城)。自私、妒忌、还有各种山寨货。以前也有过这些事情,它们导致了可怕的后果。

85. Our investment style has been given a name – focus investing – which implies ten holdings, not one hundred or four hundred. The idea that it is hard to find good investments, so concentrate in a few, seems to me to be an obvious idea. But 98% of the investment world does not think this way. It’s been good for us.

我们的投资风格被称作焦点投资,意在持有十只股票、而不是一百个或者四百个。好投资不好找,所以应该集中在那些少数几个好的上,这对于我是很显而易见的事情。但是投资界98%的人都不这么想。这对我们倒是挺好的。

86. You want to be very careful with intense ideology. It presents a big danger for the only mind you’re ever going to get.”

你要当心过于强烈的意识形态观念。如果你脑子里只有一个念头的话那是非常危险的。

87. Like Warren, I had a considerable passion to get rich. “Not because I wanted Ferraris– I wanted the independence. I desperately wanted it.

和巴菲特一样,我有很强的致富欲望。不是因为我喜欢法拉利什么的,而是我喜欢独立。我极度渴望独立。

88. Anyone with an engineering frame of mind will look at [accounting standards] and want to throw up.

每一个有工程师思维的人看到会计准则都会想吐。

89. You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.

你只有学会了如何学习才能进步。

90. It’s a good habit to trumpet your failures and be quiet about your successes.

多谈谈你的失败历程、少吹嘘你的成功经历,这样对你好。


91. In effect about half our spare cash was stashed in currencies other than the dollar. I consider that a non-event. As it happens it’s been a very profitable non-event.

实际效果上说,我们有一半的闲置现金是以美元以外的货币形式存储的。我觉得这个不是什么大事儿。没想到这件事情成了件很赚钱的小事儿。

92. As for what we like least, we don’t want kleptocracies. We need a rule of law. If people are stealing from the companies, we don’t need that.

我们最不喜欢的东西就是盗贼统治。我们需要法治。如果人们都从公司里盗取东西,我们不要这种公司。

93. I agree with Peter Drucker that the culture and legal systems of the United States are especially favorable to shareholder interests, compared to other interests and compared to most other countries. Indeed, there are many other countries where any good going to public shareholders has a very low priority and almost every other constituency stands higher in line.

我同意德鲁克的观点,他认为美国相对其他国家而言是对公司股东最优惠的国家。事实上,很多国家的上市公司股东权益是很没优先级的,需要让位于各种其他人群的利益。

94. Berkshire in its history has made money betting on sure things.

伯克希尔的历史就是在确定的事情上打赌的过程。

95. I don’t think there’s any business that we’ve bought that would have sold itself to a hedge fund. There’s a class of businesses that doesn’t want to deal with private-equity and hedge funds…thank God

我觉得我们买的公司都不会愿意把股份卖给对冲基金。有那么一类公司是不愿意应付私募股权和对冲基金的,谢天谢地有这种公司。

96. We’re guessing at our future opportunity cost. Warren is guessing that he’ll have the opportunity to put capital out at high rates of return, so he’s not willing to put it out at less than 10% now. But if we knew interest rates would stay at 1%, we’d change. Our hurdles reflect our estimate of future opportunity costs.

我们在猜测未来的机会成本。巴菲特认为将来有可能遇到很高回报的机会,所以他现在不会为10%回报的机会出手。但是如果我们知道利率一直保持在1%,我们会改变策略的。我们的仓位取决于我们对未来机会成本的预测。

97. Our ideas are so simple that people keep asking us for mysteries when all we have are the most elementary ideas.

我们的想法都是很简单的,以至于人们总是希望我们能说点儿神秘的东西出来,但是我们的方法就是这么简单。

98. The idea of a margin of safety, a Graham precept, will never be obsolete. The idea of making the market your servant will never be obsolete. The idea of being objective and dispassionate will never be obsolete. So Graham had a lot of wonderful ideas.

格雷厄姆的安全边际理念、不让市场主宰自己的理念、保持平常心的理念永远都不会过时。所以格雷厄姆有很多很好的理念。

99. Ben Graham could run his Geiger counter over this detritus from the collapse of the 1930s and find things selling below their working capital per share and so on….? But he was, by and large, operating when the world was in shell shock from the 1930s—which was the worst contraction in the English-speaking world in about 600 years. Wheat in Liverpool, I believe, got down to something like a 600-year low, adjusted for inflation. the classic Ben Graham concept is that gradually the world wised up and those real obvious bargains disappeared. You could run your Geiger counter over the rubble and it wouldn’t click. … Ben Graham followers responded by changing the calibration on their Geiger counters. In effect, they started defining a bargain in a different way. And they kept changing the definition so that they could keep doing what they’d always done. And it still worked pretty well.

格雷厄姆的方法就像是拿着探测器在30年代的废墟里寻找宝贝,股价比每股现金还低的便宜股票。但总的来说,他工作的时代是全世界还陷在二战战后恐惧症的时代,那是英语世界600年来通缩最严重的时代。利物浦的小麦价格跌到了600年的最低值。经典的格雷厄姆理念认为世界会渐渐苏醒过来,这些便宜会消失的。你拿着那时候的探测器在现在的废墟里恐怕是找不到宝贝的。所以格雷厄姆的追随者们就调整了探测器,他们开始用现代的方法来定义宝贝。他们一直在改进探测器,来做自己擅长的事情,寻宝。直到现在,他们都还做得不错。

100. Warren and I don’t feel like we have any great advantage in the high-tech sector. In fact, we feel like we’re at a big disadvantage in trying to understand the nature of technical developments in software, computer chips or what have you. So we tend to avoid that stuff, based on our personal inadequacies. Again, that is a very, very powerful idea. Every person is going to have a circle of competence. And it’s going to be very hard to advance that circle. If I had to make my living as a musician…. I can’t even think of a level low enough to describe where I would be sorted out to if music were the measuring standard of the civilization.? So you have to figure out what your own aptitudes are. If you play games where other people have the aptitudes and you don’t, you’re going to lose. And that’s as close to certain as any prediction that you can make. You have to figure out where you’ve got an edge. And you’ve got to play within your own circle of competence.? If you want to be the best tennis player in the world, you may start out trying and soon find out that it’s hopeless—that other people blow right by you. However, if you want to become the best plumbing contractor in Bemidji, that is probably doable by two-thirds of you. It takes a will. It takes the intelligence. But after a while, you’d gradually know all about the plumbing business in Bemidji and master the art. That is an attainable objective, given enough discipline. And people who could never win a chess tournament or stand in center court in a respectable tennis tournament can rise quite high in life by slowly developing a circle of competence—which results partly from what they were born with and partly from what they slowly develop through work.

巴菲特和我在高科技领域都没有什么优势。我们觉得让我们去了解软件、芯片之类的东西我们讨不着好。所以,基于这些不足,我们尽量避免这些东西。这又是一个很重要的思维。每个人都有自己的能力圈,而且这个能力圈很难增长。如果我要依靠音乐谋生的话我就完蛋了。所以你应该想想自己的天资在什么地方。如果你在从事别人有天赋而你没有的工作,你肯定是要输的。没有意外。你要知道你的强项在什么地方,要在你的能力圈里面玩儿。如果你想做天下第一网球手,你可能很快发现自己没戏,有人会迅速赢你好几条街。但是如果你想做城关镇的水管承包商,可能三分之二的人都能做到。这需要一个意向和一些智力投入。但是一段时间之后你就会慢慢了解城关镇的水管行业并且渐渐掌握这门艺术了。这是一个可以达到的目标,只要有足够的付出。就是运用一些与生俱来或者后天慢慢养成的能力圈,那些即使从来没有赢过象棋比赛和网球比赛的人们也可以在生活中走向不小的成功。

101. Beta and modern portfolio theory and the like – none of it makes any sense to me.

"风险系数贝塔"和"现代投资组合理论"都一样 --- 对于我来说完全是瞎搞。

102. Today, it seems to be regarded as the duty of CEOs to make the stock go up. This leads to all sorts of foolish behavior. We want to tell it like it is.

今天,保持股价似乎成了总裁们的任务之一,这引发了很多愚蠢的行为。我们这是实事求是。

103. Our standard prescription for the know-nothing investor with a long-term time horizon is a no-load index fund. I think that works better than relying on your stock broker. The people who are telling you to do something else are all being paid by commissions or fees. The result is that while index fund investing is becoming more and more popular, by and large it’s not the individual investors that are doing it. It’s the institutions.

对门外汉投资者们,我们的一贯标准建议都是购买免佣金的指数基金。我认为这要比你的股票经纪的建议更好。那些建议你购买其他金融产品的人往往都是借以收取佣金和费用的。其结果就是越来越多的资金投放在指数基金上,而这里大部分都是机构,而不是个人。(意即他们拿了你的钱去买指数基金,还收你手续费和佣金。)

104. closet indexing….you’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker.

"黑箱追指数"投资法(一种大部分钱投资于指数成份股,小部分由基金经理选股的投资组合,一般不公开策略,意在接近指数的表现)……你给经理支付一大笔钱,而他把85%的钱照着指数成分投资。如果你是这么干的,你就被人当傻子玩儿了。

105. Black-Scholes is a know-nothing system. If you know nothing about value — only price — then Black-Scholes is a pretty good guess at what a 90-day option might be worth. But the minute you get into longer periods of time, it’s crazy to get into Black-Scholes.

布莱克-舒尔斯模型(一种衍生品定价模型)是一种白痴模型。如果你对于标的物的价值一无所知而只知道价格,那么这个模型对于90天的期权定价还是有价值的。但当你要放眼于更长的时间的时候,使用这个模型就是疯了。

106. Black-Scholes works for short-term options, but if it’s a long-term option and you think you know something [about the underlying asset], it’s insane to use Black-Scholes.

106,同105.

107. It’s hard to predict what will happen with two brands in a market.? Sometimes they will behave in a gentlemanly way, and sometimes they’ll pound each other.? I know of no way to predict whether they’ll compete moderately or to the death.? If you could figure it out, you could make a lot of money.

很难预测市场上两个品牌间的竞争状况。有时候他们会很君子般的竞争,有时候他们又会互相猛砍。我无法预测他们是会温和共存还是血战到底。如果你能预测得到,你就能赚很多钱。

108. We’ve really made the money out of high quality businesses. In some cases, we bought the whole business. And in some cases, we just bought a big block of stock. But when you analyze what happened, the big money’s been made in the high quality businesses. And most of the other people who’ve made a lot of money have done so in high quality businesses.

我们挣的钱都是从那些优质企业中来的。有些是我们全资收购的、有些是我们部分拥有的。但是当你分析我们的情况时,大钱总是从优质企业里来。其他人也是这样,从优质企业身上赚到钱。

109. A lot of share-buying, not bargain-seeking, is designed to prop stock prices up. Thirty to 40 years ago, it was very profitable to look at companies that were aggressively buying their own shares. They were motivated simply to buy below what it was worth.

现在很多股份回购的行为只是为了刺激股价而不是趁低吸收股权。三四十年前,如果你去寻找那些积极回购股票的公司,可以赚不少钱,因为他们那时候都是因为股价低于价值才回购的,很纯粹很简单。

110. There are two kinds of businesses: The first earns 12%, and you can take it out at the end of the year. The second earns 12%, but all the excess cash must be reinvested — there’s never any cash. It reminds me of the guy who looks at all of his equipment and says, “There’s all of my profit.” We hate that kind of business.

有两种生意:第一种每年挣12%,年底可以把钱拿回来;第二种每年挣12%,但是利润必须重新投入运营,永远也看不到现金。这让我想到了一个家伙,他看着手里的一大堆(不能变现的)工具装备,慨然叹曰:“这就是我的全部利润了。” 我们可不喜欢这种生意。


111. There are actually businesses, that you will find a few times in a lifetime, where any manager could raise the return enormously just by raising prices—and yet they haven’t done it. So they have huge untapped pricing power that they’re not using. That is the ultimate no-brainer. … Disney found that it could raise those prices a lot and the attendance stayed right up.? So a lot of the great record of Eisner and Wells … came from just raising prices at Disneyland and Disneyworld and through video cassette sales of classic animated movies… At Berkshire Hathaway, Warren and I raised the prices of See’s Candy a little faster than others might have. And, of course, we invested in Coca-Cola—which had some untapped pricing power. And it also had brilliant management. So a Goizueta and Keough could do much more than raise prices. It was perfect.

有些生意你在人生中会见识几次,这些生意里,随便找个人当经理都能大幅提高利润,只需要提高商品价格就行。但是他们又没有这么做。所以他们有很多未开发的定价权。这些生意是最不需要动脑子的。迪士尼发现他们不管怎么提价,入场率都是那么高。所以艾斯纳和威尔斯(迪士尼CEO)的“杰出表现”很大部分来源于给迪士尼乐园门票提价或者给迪士尼的动画提价。在我们这儿,巴菲特和我给喜诗糖果提价的速度比别人都更快一些。另外,当然了,我们也投资了可口可乐,可口可乐也是有很多未开发的定价权的。而且可口可乐还有一个很棒的管理层,所以他们的CEO可以做许多提价以外的事情。这很完美。

112. At Berkshire Hathaway we do not like to compete against Chinese manufacturers.

我们伯克希尔不喜欢和中国生产企业竞争。

113. Berkshire is in the business of making easy predictions ?If a deal looks too hard, the partners simply shelve it.

伯克希尔的工作是做简单的预测,如果一个交易太难搞懂,我们会把它搁置一边。

114. We’re the tortoise that has outrun the hare because it chose the easy predictions.

我们是跑赢兔子的乌龟,因为我们挑那些简单的事情来预测。

115. Warren and I avoid doing anything that someone else at Berkshire can do better. You don’t really have a competency if you don’t know the edge of it.

巴菲特和我尽量不做那些公司内有人比我们做得好的事情。如果你不知道你的能力圈的边缘在哪儿,你等于没有能力圈。

116. Understanding both the power of compound return and the difficulty of getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things.

理解复利的强大和难于达成,是理解很多事情的精髓。

117. Generally speaking, it can’t be good to be running a big current account deficit and a big fiscal deficit and have them both growing. You would be thinking the end there would be a comeuppance.” “[But] it isn’t as though all the other options look wonderful compared to the US. It gives me some feeling that what I regard as fiscal misbehavior on our part could go on some time without paying the price.

总的来说,美国同时持续增长的出超和财政赤字肯定不是什么好事儿,你会想到最后应该会有个大报应的。但是比起(投资在)美国,其他的选择也不见得有多好。所以我的感觉是,虽然现在我们的财政不太靠谱,但一段时间内继续如此也暂时不会付出代价。

118. We started from such a strong position. It’s not as if the alternatives are all so great. I can understand why people would rather invest in the? U.S. Do you want to be in Europe, where 12-13% of people are unemployed and most 28-year-olds are living at home and being paid by state to do it? Or be in Brazil or Venezuela with the political instability that you fear? It’s not totally irrational that? people still like the U.S., despite its faults. Whatever misbehavior there is could go on quite a long time without a price being paid.

我们(美国)的底子很好。除了美国以外其他的选择也不怎么样。我可以理解为什么人们还是宁愿投资在美国。难道你想投到欧洲吗?那儿的失业率高达12%、13%,大部分28岁的人都住在家里靠政府养着。难道你想投到巴西和委内瑞拉?那儿的政局不稳你整天得担惊受怕。美国有这么多的错误但是人们依然喜爱美国是有道理的。现在不靠谱的(财政策略)还可以继续一段时间而不用付出代价。

119. Almost all good businesses engage in ‘pain today, gain tomorrow’ activities.

几乎所有的好生意都是“今日付出,明日回报”类的。

120. No CEO examining books today understands what the hell is going on.

今天的总裁没有能通过看报表搞明白发生什么事儿的。(意在讽刺现代财报的不科学)

121. Generally speaking, if you’re counting on outside directors to act [forcefully to protect your interests as a shareholder, then you’re crazy].? As a general rule in? America, boards act only if there’s been a severe disgrace. My friend Joe was asked to be on the board of Northwestern Bell and he jokes that ‘it was the last thing they ever asked me.’?I think you get better directors when you get directors who don’t need the money. ?When it’s half your income and all your retirement, you’re not likely to be very independent.? But when you have money and an existing reputation that you don’t want to lose, then you’ll act more independently.

一般而言,如果你指望外部董事采取行动或者有力地保护您作为股东的利益,那你这个想法就疯了。 作为一般规则? 在美国,只有在出现严重的耻辱时,董事会才会采取行动。 我的朋友乔被要求担任西北贝尔公司的董事会成员,他开玩笑说:“这是他们问过我的最后一件事。”?我认为当您找到不需要这些钱的董事时,您就会变得更好。 “当收入和退休全部收入的一半时,您不太可能会非常独立。” 但是,当您拥有金钱和不想失去的声誉时,您将更加独立。

122. If mutual fund directors are independent, then I’m the lead character in the Bolshoi Ballet.

如果共有基金的董事能够做到独立,那我就是莫斯科芭蕾舞团的主跳。

123. Of course I’m troubled by huge consumer debt levels – we’ve pushed consumer credit very hard in the US.? Eventually, if it keeps growing, it will stop growing. As Herb Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”? When it stops, it may be unpleasant.? Other than Herb Stein’s quote, I have no comment.

我当然对现在的巨大消费债务感到担忧。我们美国一直过于致力于推进信用消费了。如果他持续增长,总有一天会停止增长的。就像赫伯·斯坦恩说的“任何不能永远前进的东西都会有停止的一刻。” 当信用消费停止增长的时候,恐怕就不好过了。我完全同意斯坦恩的说法,别无评价。

124. I think it would be a great improvement if there were no D&O insurance . The counter-argument is that no-one with any money would serve on a board. But I think net net you’d be better off.

如果消灭“董事高管责任保险”,我认为是一大进步。但反方的观点认为那样的话有钱人就都不愿意担任董事了。但总的来说我认为消灭它还是好的。

125. We don’t care about quarterly earnings (though obviously we care about how the business is doing over time) and are unwilling to manipulate in any way to make some quarter look better.

我们不在意单季度盈利(虽然我们关注一个企业长期表现如何),也很不愿意用任何方法修改报表以便某一季度的结果看上去更好。

126. What we don’t like in modern capitalism is the expectations game. It’s not the kissing cousin of evil; it’s the blood brother.

对于现代资本主义,我们不喜欢的部分是拼预测。这玩意儿特别邪恶。

127. There are a lot of things we pass on. We have three baskets: in, out, and too tough…We have to have a special insight, or we’ll put it in the ‘too tough’ basket. All of you have to look for a special area of competency and focus on that.

我们略过很多东西的。我们有三个篮子:留着的、要扔的、太难懂的。如果我们没有特别看懂它的前景,我们就把它扔进太难懂的那个篮子。你们要做的就是寻找一个你们特别有竞争力的领域并且专注于此。

128. We have a history when things are really horrible of wading in when no one else will.

我们曾经在没有任何人敢涉足的时候进场(买进)过。

129. We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital. [Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it revolting. Just because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable.

我们当今用房子套钱的方法以前从未出现过。你问张三他是怎么买的宝马,他会告诉你是靠抵押房子贷的款。我们现在资本过剩。资本过剩会导致人们疯狂刷信用卡和放债人发放次贷,发放次贷是一个肮脏的生意。它诱惑人们前往绝地。这是一种获取奴隶的新方法,这是很脏的生意。我们有些金融机构,包括那些大行,都在向那些弱势群体发放次贷。我觉得这种行为令人厌恶。自由市场是自由的并不意味着它就是光荣的。

130. We don’t believe that markets are totally efficient and we don’t believe that widespread diversification will yield a good result.? We believe almost all good investments will involve relatively low diversification. Maybe 2% of people will come into our corner of the tent and the rest of the 98% will believe what they’ve been told.

我们不认为市场是完全有效的,也不相信分散投资会带来更好的结果。我们认为最好的投资都是比较集中的。大概2%的人会跟我们站在同一个立场,其他的都还是相信他们所听到的那些谬论。

131. Efficient market theory [is]? a wonderful economic doctrine that had a long vogue in spite of the experience of Berkshire Hathaway. In fact one of the economists who won — he shared a Nobel Prize — and as he looked at Berkshire Hathaway year after year, which people would throw in his face as saying maybe the market isn’t quite as efficient as you think, he said, “Well, it’s a two-sigma event.” And then he said we were a three-sigma event. And then he said we were a four-sigma event. And he finally got up to six sigmas — better to add a sigma than change a theory, just because the evidence comes in differently.And, of course, when this share of a Nobel Prize went into money management himself, he sank like a stone.

市场有效论是一个很好的经济学教条,流行了很长时间,但是跟我们伯克希尔的经验相悖。事实上依靠此理论获得诺贝尔奖的其中一位经济学家也观察了我们公司好多年,人们当他面质问他,说市场恐怕不那么有效吧,不然怎么解释伯克希尔的战绩,他就说我们是一个小概率的例子,有两个标准差。然后他又说我们这个例子有三个标准差。然后又说我们四个标准差。最后终于多到了六个标准差。他宁愿给我们多弄几个标准差也不愿意修改他的理论。当然了,最后当他拿获得的诺贝尔奖金自己去投资的时候,钱就泥牛入海了。

132. I know just enough about? thermodynamics to understand that if it takes too much fossil-fuel energy to create ethanol, that’s a very stupid way to solve an energy problem.

我虽然懂的热力学知识不多,但还是足以判断这个事儿:如果你要花费很多石油资源去生产乙醇,那么用乙醇替代石油就是一件很傻的节能方案。

133. It is entirely possible that you could use our mental models to find good IPOs to buy. There are countless IPOs every year, and I’m sure that there are a few cinches that you could jump on. But the average person is going to get creamed. So if you’re talented, good luck. IPOs are too small for us, or too high tech, so we won’t understand them. So, if Warren’s looking at them, I don’t know about it.

你用我们的思路去找靠谱的IPO来买是完全可能的。每年都有数不清的IPO,我相信肯定有一些是值得整一下的。但是大部分人都是被忽悠的。如果你很有才能,祝你好运。对我们来说,IPO要么太小、要么太高科技所以我们搞不懂。如果巴菲特有在关注它们,我自己是不知道的。

(大道批注:我对刚刚IPO的公司也不感兴趣,主要是没足够时间和资料去搞懂。)

134. Well envy/jealousy made, what, two out of the ten commandments? Those of you who have raised siblings you know about envy, or tried to run a law firm or investment bank or even a faculty? I’ve heard Warren say a half a dozen times, “It’s not greed that drives the world, but envy."

你看,妒忌和嫉妒,一个事儿占了十诫里的两个位置。你们养过小孩儿们的、开律所的、管投行的、甚至当系主任的,都知道妒忌是怎么回事儿。我听巴菲特说过好多次:“带领世界前进的不是贪婪、而是妒忌的力量。”

135. Suppose, any one of you knew of a wonderful thing right now that you were overwhelmingly confident- and correctly so- would produce about 12% per annum compounded as far as you could see. Now, if you actually had that available, and by going into it you were forfeiting all opportunities to make money faster- there’re a lot of you who wouldn’t like that. But a lot of you would think, “What the hell do I care if somebody else makes money faster?” There’s always going to be somebody who is making money faster, running the mile faster or what have you. So in a human sense, once you get something that works fine in your life, the idea of caring terribly that somebody else is making money faster strikes me as insane.

假设一个场景,你知道有一个铁板钉钉没跑儿的机会可以带来12%的复合年回报。现在,假如这个机会放在你面前,但是要求你从此不再接受别的赚快钱的机会,你们中大部分人是不愿意干的。但你们中很多人也会说:“别人赚钱快为什么我要在意呢?” 这世界总有些人会赚钱比你快、跑得比你快、或者别的什么比你快。但是,从理智的角度来思考,一旦你自己找到了一件运行良好的机制能致富,还非要在意别人赚钱比你快,这在我来看就是疯了。

(大道批注:这里我看到两点:1.平常心地呆在自己能力圈内; 2. 12%是个可接受的年复合回报率。)


全文完结!

极速3分6合—极速5分6合转发:33回复:11喜欢:89

全部评论

杨依然52011-13 15:27

白酒板块前景怎么样?

snowcity9911-11 17:02

芒格主义,大道点评 下

wishingcat11-11 00:33

99

思弦君11-10 23:36

谢谢。麻烦提醒一下这个错误是在第多少条?我马上修改

wishingcat11-10 23:19

感谢作者一直以来的分享!有个小错误,600百年应为600年。